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Limitations on Workers 
Bringing Third Party 
Actions Under Section 58 
of the Workers' 
Compensation Act 
by Matthew I. Lynn 
T he Court of Appeals of Maryland in Smith v. Bethlehem Steel Corpo-ration, I addressed the effect of the 
statute of limitations, regarding claims of 
employees against third parties, on the em-
ployer/employee relationship under § 58 
of the Workers' Compensation Act. 2 
The plaintiff, Smith, was a brick layer 
employed by Bethlehem Steel Corporation 
(Bethlehem) at its Sparrows Point, Mary-
land plant from 1948 to 1981. Smith dis-
covered in March of 1979 that he had con-
tracted asbestosis. 3 Mr. Smith had been 
exposed to asbestos and products contain-
ing asbestos during his employment with 
Bethlehem. Seeking recovery for injuries, 
Smith and his wife filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of 
Maryland in August 1981.4 The Smiths 
named fifteen defendants in their com-
plaint including distributors and manufac-
turers of asbestos products, three physi-
cians, and Bethlehem itself. Mr. Smith 
contended that his asbestosis was caused 
by "the deliberate intention of [Bethlehem] 
to produce such injury .... "5 
In March of 1982, Smith filed a claim 
with the Maryland Workers' Compensa-
tion Commission (Commission) 6 request-
ing benefits alleging occupational disease. 
Smith then filed a request for a stay of the 
proceedings in the workers' compensation 
claim on June 8, 1982, on the ground that 
th,e claim could be rendered moot depend-
ing on the outcome of the suit filed previ-
ously in federal court. 7 
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In September of 1982, pursuant to a dis-
covery order by the federal court, Bethle-
hem produced records which revealed the 
involvement of Quigley Gompany, Kaiser 
Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, and 
International Minerals and Chemical Cor-
poration. These additional companies were 
thought to have supplied products to Beth-
lehem which might have contained asbestos. 
In November 1983, Smith amended his 
federal court complaint to include the 
aforementioned suppliers as additional de-
fendants. 8 The newly named defendants 
subsequently moved for summary judg-
ment. They contended that the time within 
which to file suit had expired with regard 
to Smith's cause of action as against them. 9 
Smith responded by contending that the 
amended claims were not time barred, cit-
ing to the second paragraph of§ 58 of the 
Workers' Compensation Act.IO The fed-
eral court, relying on the Uniform Certifi-
cation of Questions of Law Act, certified a 
question to the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land to ascertain how paragraph two of 
§ 58 affected limitations in third party 
actions. II 
The first paragraph of§ 58 of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act provides that where 
injury or death is caused under Circum-
stances creating a legal liability in a third 
party to pay damages, the employee may 
proceed against that third party to re-
cover damages, or against the employer for 
compensation, or both in the case of joint 
tortfeasors. If compensation is claimed, 
awarded, or paid under this article, an 
employer may enforce, for its benefit, the 
liability of such other person. If an em-
ployer does not start proceedings to en-
force the liability of such other person 
within two months from the passage of an 
award by the Commission, the injured em-
ployee may enforce the liability. 12 
The second paragraph of§ 58, as amended 
in 1985, addresses the tolling of the limita-
tions period. 13 Unfortunately, there is no 
legislative history which would assist in 
ascertaining the legislative intent of the 
second paragraph. 14 The paragraph pro-
vides: 
When any employee has a right of 
action under this section against a 
third party, the period of limitations 
for such action, as to such employee, 
shall not begin to run until two months 
after the first award of compensation 
made to such employee under this ar-
ticle, and this section shall apply to 
past and future rights of action under 
this section. 15 
The Smith court held that this amend-
ment to § 58 tolled the unexpired period of 
limitations against a third party tortfeasor, 
during the two month period following an 
award of workers' compensation benefits, 
during which time the employer has the 
exclusive right to file a civil action against 
the third-party tortfeasor. 16 However, it is 
not clear whether the court's decision in 
Smith gives the plaintiff two additional 
months beyond the statutorily defmed three-
year period 17 during which he may file 
suit. The court did not indicate under what 
circumstances the two month extension pe-
riod would apply. This author believes 
that the most reasonable interpretation of 
Smith is that § 58 extends the limitation 
period for an additional two month period 
only in two instances. They are: 
1) when the award of workers' compen-
sation benefits is made during the last two 
months before the statute of limitations 
runs out under § 5-101, and 
2) during the two-month period within 
which the employer still has the exclusive 
right to bring such an action. IS 
It is important to note that an action 
brought by an employer under § 58 can 
only be brought as a derivative action. The 
employer's right to participate in such a 
suit arises only when the injured employee 
brings a workers' compensation claim. The 
court's interpretation of § 58 requires that 
the benefits be both "claimed and awarded 
or paid" 19 before the claimant's employer 
had standing to bring an action under that 
statute. In addition, the employee has no 
independent standing to bring a third party 
action against the negligent tortfeasor. 20 
Statutes of limitations have been de-
scribed as remedial legislation that rest on 
sound public policy.21 The reasoning be-
hind the policy decision to limit the time 
period within which a party may bring 
legal action for an injury is to balance the 
competing interests of the potential adver-
sarial parties in addition to certain societal 
interests. 22 On the one hand, there is a de-
sire to grant to the potential plaintiff an 
adequate period of time within which he 
may, using reasonable diligence, pursue a 
claim. On the other hand, a limitation 
period assures a potential defendant that 
there shall be a period of time beyond 
which he will no longer be subject to the 
uncertainty and risk which accompanies 
potential liability. 
[O]ne of the purposes of such statutes 
is to assure fairness to a potential de-
fendant by providing a certain degree 
of repose. This is accomplished by en-
couraging promptness in prosecuting 
actions; suppressing stale or fraudulent 
claims; avoiding inconvenience that 
may stem from delay, such as loss of 
evidence, fading of memories, and dis-
appearance of witnesses; and . . . to 
promote judicial economy. 23 
The courts have held that statutes of 
limitations should be strictly construed 
to further the public policy which serves 
as the basis for their enactment. 24 The 
courts have refused to give such statutes a 
strained construction which would result 
in evading their effect. 25 In addition, it 
has been held that statutes of limitations 
have "[t]heir justification in necessity and 
convenience rather than logic. They repre-
sent expedients, rather than principles." 26 
Section 5-101 provides that "[a] civil ac-
tion at law shall be filed within three years 
from the date it accrues unless another 
provision of the Code provides a different 
period of time within which an action shall 
be commenced." 27 Therefore, unless there 
is another applicable provision of the Code 
which provides a different period of limi-
tation, one who attempts to file a civil ac-
tion at law more than three years from the 
date it accrues will be barred. 2s 
While § 5-101 provides that the statute 
of limitation period expires three years 
from the date when the cause of action ac-
crues, one must look to case law to deter-
mine when a cause of action actually ac-
crues. 29 In Maryland, the general rule is 
that a cause of action "accrues" upon the 
occurrence of the alleged wrongful conduct 
of the tortfeasor. 30 However, several legis-
lative and judicial exceptions to this rule 
have been carved out; the most notable is 
the "discovery rule" which is applicable to 
all cases involving professional malprac-
tice, latent diseases, faulty construction 
and certain defamation actions. 3 I 
"First, it willfurther 
the primary purpose 
of the statute of 
limitations, namely 
protecting potential 
defendants from 
l l
· " sta e calms . .. 
The decision of the court of appeals in 
Smith implies that the second paragraph of 
§ 58 would affect the period oflimitations 
governed by § 5-101 in an action brought 
by an employee against a third party tort-
feasor. This would occur only in instances 
where the three year limitation period man-
dated by § 5-101 would expire during the 
two month period following the first award 
of workers' compensation benefits. During 
this period the employer has the exclusive 
right to bring an action against the negli-
gent tortfeasor. 32 If such factual circum-
stances are not present, then under Smith 
there would be no reason for tolling the 
statute of limitations for a two month 
period after the award of workers' com-
pensation benefits to the claimant. 33 In 
such instances, limitations of actions would 
be governed exclusively by § 5-101, and 
the plaintiff would not have the additional 
two month grace period within which to 
file a claim under § 58. 
After Smith an employee can no longer 
file a workers' compensation claim imme-
diately prior to the running of the limita-
tions period and after receiving an award, 
expect to have an additional three year lim-
itations period before filing a § 58 action. 
Article 101, § 39 operates concurrently 
with the three-year statute of limitations 
in any personal injury case as set forth in 
§ 5-101. After Smith, the injured employee 
will be unsuccessful in contending that the 
statute oflimitations as set forth in § 5-101 
does not commence running until after the 
Workers' Compensation Commission has 
made the first award of compensation to 
such employee. 
Under the ruling in Smith, notwith-
standing the language of paragraph two of 
§ 58, whenever a third-party cause of action 
arises out of an employee's work-related in-
jury, the three-year statute of limitations 
on such a claim begins to run from the date 
the tortious conduct accrues. This is gen-
erally upon the occurrence of the alleged 
wrong unless the discovery rule applies. In 
situations similar to that in Smith where a 
claimant discovers a latent development of 
disease, the cause of action accrues under 
§ 5-101 when the injury is discovered, or 
through the exercise of reasonable care and 
diligence should have discovered the na-
ture and cause of the injury. 
The effect of Smith will be twofold. First, 
it will further the primary purpose of the 
statute of limitations, namely, protecting 
potential defendants against stale claims 
brought after the expiration of the time in 
which a person of ordinary diligence would 
have brought an action. The rationale for 
this objective is to give assurance to the de-
fendant that he will not be liable for an in-
determinable length of time for any tortious 
conduct he may have committed. The sec-
ond effect of Smith will be to promote ju-
dicial economy by encouraging promptness 
in instituting § 58 claims. 
It appears that the court in Smith in-
tended the statute oflimitations for the fil-
ing of an action against a third-party de-
fendant to be tolled for only the two month 
period following an award of workers' 
compensation benefits to an injured worker 
and only if the three year statute oflimita-
tions expired during that two month pe-
riod. The court will no doubt have to clar-
ify Smith further in the future. 
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